DEFA14A 1 d817841ddefa14a.htm DEFA14A DEFA14A

 

 

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CoreLogic’s Board Is Best Positioned to Maximize Shareholder Value November 2020 • Record 2020 financial results and strong momentum into 2021 and 2022 • CoreLogic’s Board, comprised of directors with substantial M&A and industry expertise, is working to maximize shareholder value Data, analytics and digital platforms connecting the housing lifecycle corelogicvalue.com 1CoreLogic’s Board Is Best Positioned to Maximize Shareholder Value November 2020 • Record 2020 financial results and strong momentum into 2021 and 2022 • CoreLogic’s Board, comprised of directors with substantial M&A and industry expertise, is working to maximize shareholder value Data, analytics and digital platforms connecting the housing lifecycle corelogicvalue.com 1


Safe Harbor/Forward Looking Statements Certain statements made in this presentation are forward-looking statements within the meaning of the federal securities laws, including but not limited to those statements related to CoreLogic, Inc.’s (“CoreLogic”, the “Company” or “us”) expected financial results, including in the second half of fiscal year 2020 and fiscal years 2021 and 2022; overall mortgage market volumes; market opportunities; stockholder value creation, repurchases of our shares, our strategic plans or growth strategy, and the near and long-term consequences of the unsolicited proposal we received from Senator Investment Group, LP (“Senator”) and Cannae Holdings, Inc. (“Cannae”) on June 26, 2020, as revised on September 14, 2020 (the “Unsolicited Proposal”). Risks and uncertainties exist that may cause the results to differ materially from those set forth in these forward-looking statements. Factors that could cause the anticipated results to differ from those described in the forward-looking statements include the risks and uncertainties set forth in Part I, Item 1A of our most recent Annual Report on Form 10-K and Part II, Item 1A of our most recent Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q, as such risk factors may be amended, supplemented, or superseded from time to time by other reports we file with the Securities and Exchange Commission. These risks and uncertainties include but are not limited to: any potential developments related to the Unsolicited Proposal; any impact resulting from COVID-19; our ability to protect our information systems against data corruption, cyber-based attacks or network security breaches; limitations on our ability to repurchase our shares; changes in prices at which we are able to repurchase our shares; limitations on access to or increase in prices for data from external sources, including government and public record sources; systems interruptions that may impair the delivery of our products and services; changes in applicable government legislation, regulations and the level of regulatory scrutiny affecting our customers or us, including with respect to consumer financial services and the use of public records and consumer data; difficult conditions in the mortgage and consumer lending industries and the economy generally; risks related to the outsourcing of services and international operations; our ability to realize the anticipated benefits of certain acquisitions and/or divestitures and the timing thereof; uncertainties regarding the outcome of any discussions with third parties indicating an interest in acquiring CoreLogic; impairments in our goodwill or other intangible assets; and our ability to generate sufficient cash to service our debt. CoreLogic can offer no assurances that it will enter any transaction in the future or, if entered, what the terms of any such transaction would be. The forward-looking statements speak only as of the date they are made. CoreLogic does not undertake to update forward-looking statements to reflect circumstances or events that occur after the date the forward- looking statements are made. Use of Non-GAAP (Generally Accepted Accounting Principles) Financial Measures This presentation contains certain non-GAAP financial measures, including adjusted EBITDA, adjusted EPS and FCF, which are provided only as supplemental information. Investors should consider these non-GAAP financial measures only in conjunction with their most directly comparable GAAP financial measures. These non-GAAP measures are not in accordance with, or a substitute for, U.S. GAAP. A reconciliation of non-GAAP measures for historical periods to the most directly comparable GAAP financial measures is included in this presentation. CoreLogic believes that its presentation of these non-GAAP measures provides useful supplemental information to investors and management regarding CoreLogic's financial condition and results of operations. Adjusted EBITDA is defined as net income from continuing operations adjusted for interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization, share- based compensation, non-operating gains/losses, and other adjustments. Adjusted EPS is defined as diluted income from continuing operations, net of tax per share, adjusted for share-based compensation, amortization of acquisition-related intangibles, non-operating gains/losses, and other adjustments; and assumes an effective tax rate of 25% for 2019 and 26% for 2020, 2021 and 2022. FCF is defined as net cash provided by continuing operating activities, less capital expenditures for purchases of property and equipment, capitalized data, and other intangible assets. Other firms may calculate non-GAAP measures differently than the Company, which limits comparability between companies. Non-GAAP measures are not in accordance with, or a substitute for, U.S. GAAP. Because the non-GAAP measures for future periods included herein are forward-looking, CoreLogic is not able to provide a reconciliation, without unreasonable efforts, of such forward-looking guidance to the most directly comparable GAAP financial measure due to the unknown effect, timing, and potential significance of special charges or gains that are material to the comparable GAAP financial measure. 2Safe Harbor/Forward Looking Statements Certain statements made in this presentation are forward-looking statements within the meaning of the federal securities laws, including but not limited to those statements related to CoreLogic, Inc.’s (“CoreLogic”, the “Company” or “us”) expected financial results, including in the second half of fiscal year 2020 and fiscal years 2021 and 2022; overall mortgage market volumes; market opportunities; stockholder value creation, repurchases of our shares, our strategic plans or growth strategy, and the near and long-term consequences of the unsolicited proposal we received from Senator Investment Group, LP (“Senator”) and Cannae Holdings, Inc. (“Cannae”) on June 26, 2020, as revised on September 14, 2020 (the “Unsolicited Proposal”). Risks and uncertainties exist that may cause the results to differ materially from those set forth in these forward-looking statements. Factors that could cause the anticipated results to differ from those described in the forward-looking statements include the risks and uncertainties set forth in Part I, Item 1A of our most recent Annual Report on Form 10-K and Part II, Item 1A of our most recent Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q, as such risk factors may be amended, supplemented, or superseded from time to time by other reports we file with the Securities and Exchange Commission. These risks and uncertainties include but are not limited to: any potential developments related to the Unsolicited Proposal; any impact resulting from COVID-19; our ability to protect our information systems against data corruption, cyber-based attacks or network security breaches; limitations on our ability to repurchase our shares; changes in prices at which we are able to repurchase our shares; limitations on access to or increase in prices for data from external sources, including government and public record sources; systems interruptions that may impair the delivery of our products and services; changes in applicable government legislation, regulations and the level of regulatory scrutiny affecting our customers or us, including with respect to consumer financial services and the use of public records and consumer data; difficult conditions in the mortgage and consumer lending industries and the economy generally; risks related to the outsourcing of services and international operations; our ability to realize the anticipated benefits of certain acquisitions and/or divestitures and the timing thereof; uncertainties regarding the outcome of any discussions with third parties indicating an interest in acquiring CoreLogic; impairments in our goodwill or other intangible assets; and our ability to generate sufficient cash to service our debt. CoreLogic can offer no assurances that it will enter any transaction in the future or, if entered, what the terms of any such transaction would be. The forward-looking statements speak only as of the date they are made. CoreLogic does not undertake to update forward-looking statements to reflect circumstances or events that occur after the date the forward- looking statements are made. Use of Non-GAAP (Generally Accepted Accounting Principles) Financial Measures This presentation contains certain non-GAAP financial measures, including adjusted EBITDA, adjusted EPS and FCF, which are provided only as supplemental information. Investors should consider these non-GAAP financial measures only in conjunction with their most directly comparable GAAP financial measures. These non-GAAP measures are not in accordance with, or a substitute for, U.S. GAAP. A reconciliation of non-GAAP measures for historical periods to the most directly comparable GAAP financial measures is included in this presentation. CoreLogic believes that its presentation of these non-GAAP measures provides useful supplemental information to investors and management regarding CoreLogic's financial condition and results of operations. Adjusted EBITDA is defined as net income from continuing operations adjusted for interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization, share- based compensation, non-operating gains/losses, and other adjustments. Adjusted EPS is defined as diluted income from continuing operations, net of tax per share, adjusted for share-based compensation, amortization of acquisition-related intangibles, non-operating gains/losses, and other adjustments; and assumes an effective tax rate of 25% for 2019 and 26% for 2020, 2021 and 2022. FCF is defined as net cash provided by continuing operating activities, less capital expenditures for purchases of property and equipment, capitalized data, and other intangible assets. Other firms may calculate non-GAAP measures differently than the Company, which limits comparability between companies. Non-GAAP measures are not in accordance with, or a substitute for, U.S. GAAP. Because the non-GAAP measures for future periods included herein are forward-looking, CoreLogic is not able to provide a reconciliation, without unreasonable efforts, of such forward-looking guidance to the most directly comparable GAAP financial measure due to the unknown effect, timing, and potential significance of special charges or gains that are material to the comparable GAAP financial measure. 2


Our Board Is Laser-Focused on Shareholder Value Creation • Our performance is strong, our revenues are recurring and diversified, and our trajectory is upward • We have delivered record revenues, record EBITDA and record cash flow in 2020 • We project 2021 and 2022 to be even better, with ~95% recurring revenue and 60%+ of 2021 growth already secured by contract wins • Our transformation into a leading info services provider positions us for a multiple re-rating, as has been increasingly recognized by research analysts, and provides further potential value upside • Our Board’s approach has developed interest in CoreLogic at values far in excess of Senator/Cannae’s lowball $66 proposal, which clearly undervalued CoreLogic • Research analysts have a median price target of $72, reaching as high as $80 (and these price targets have been increasing) (1) (1) • We have increased 2020 revenue guidance by ~$225mm and 2020 adjusted EBITDA guidance by ~$110mm since the hostile proposal • Our Board has solicited interests from third parties indicating an interest in acquiring CoreLogic at or above $80 per share – significantly in excess of Senator/Cannae’s lowball $66 proposal • CoreLogic’s Board has tens of billions of dollars of M&A experience, substantial industry expertise and is focused on maximizing value for our shareholders • Senator/Cannae’s slate was nominated to implement the lowball proposal – which they are no longer pursuing as it was clearly inadequate – and has multiple connections to Senator’s Quentin Koffey and Cannae’s Bill Foley, questionable M&A track records and no relevant industry expertise CoreLogic’s Board has delivered value, including soliciting interest at $80+more than $1 billion – or over 20% – above the Senator/Cannae proposal Board representation is not warranted for Senator/Cannae’s nominees 1. Based on midpoint of guidance ranges 3Our Board Is Laser-Focused on Shareholder Value Creation • Our performance is strong, our revenues are recurring and diversified, and our trajectory is upward • We have delivered record revenues, record EBITDA and record cash flow in 2020 • We project 2021 and 2022 to be even better, with ~95% recurring revenue and 60%+ of 2021 growth already secured by contract wins • Our transformation into a leading info services provider positions us for a multiple re-rating, as has been increasingly recognized by research analysts, and provides further potential value upside • Our Board’s approach has developed interest in CoreLogic at values far in excess of Senator/Cannae’s lowball $66 proposal, which clearly undervalued CoreLogic • Research analysts have a median price target of $72, reaching as high as $80 (and these price targets have been increasing) (1) (1) • We have increased 2020 revenue guidance by ~$225mm and 2020 adjusted EBITDA guidance by ~$110mm since the hostile proposal • Our Board has solicited interests from third parties indicating an interest in acquiring CoreLogic at or above $80 per share – significantly in excess of Senator/Cannae’s lowball $66 proposal • CoreLogic’s Board has tens of billions of dollars of M&A experience, substantial industry expertise and is focused on maximizing value for our shareholders • Senator/Cannae’s slate was nominated to implement the lowball proposal – which they are no longer pursuing as it was clearly inadequate – and has multiple connections to Senator’s Quentin Koffey and Cannae’s Bill Foley, questionable M&A track records and no relevant industry expertise CoreLogic’s Board has delivered value, including soliciting interest at $80+more than $1 billion – or over 20% – above the Senator/Cannae proposal Board representation is not warranted for Senator/Cannae’s nominees 1. Based on midpoint of guidance ranges 3


Senator/Cannae Abandoned Their Undervalued Proposal When the Board Obtained Interest at Appropriate Values Senator/Cannae urged shareholders to take their $65/66 price as full value, which is ~18% below the indications of interest that our Board has obtained “We are pleased to submit this proposal “While we are not a bidder at these to acquire the Company for $65.00 per prices, it would be a great outcome for share in cash…we believe this proposal shareholders” delivers full value to shareholders and is well in excess of what the Company can achieve under its current plans” – Senator/Cannae Press Release (1) – Senator/Cannae Press Release (October 30, 2020) (1) (June 26, 2020) The Board’s judgment to reject the lowball proposal has been proven correct 1. Permission to use quotes neither sought nor obtained 4Senator/Cannae Abandoned Their Undervalued Proposal When the Board Obtained Interest at Appropriate Values Senator/Cannae urged shareholders to take their $65/66 price as full value, which is ~18% below the indications of interest that our Board has obtained “We are pleased to submit this proposal “While we are not a bidder at these to acquire the Company for $65.00 per prices, it would be a great outcome for share in cash…we believe this proposal shareholders” delivers full value to shareholders and is well in excess of what the Company can achieve under its current plans” – Senator/Cannae Press Release (1) – Senator/Cannae Press Release (October 30, 2020) (1) (June 26, 2020) The Board’s judgment to reject the lowball proposal has been proven correct 1. Permission to use quotes neither sought nor obtained 4


CoreLogic Is Far More Valuable Than Senator/Cannae’s Lowball Proposal CoreLogic’s Board was clearly correct in determining that Senator/Cannae’s proposal significantly undervalued the Company – and by rejecting it, has generated interest more in-line with the value of the Company ($ in millions) 2020 Adjusted 2020 Adjusted Implied Share Price EBITDA Guidance EBITDA Multiple Value at Historical ~11.3x Trading Multiples and $615 - $630 Pre-COVID and pre-proposal ~$71 - ~$73 (1) Trading Multiple No Takeover Premium Senator/Cannae ~13.4x (2) Multiple Applied to $615 - $630 Implied Multiple of ~$86 - ~$89 Hostile Proposal CoreLogic EBITDA ~15.1x Upside Case From Lowest $615 - $630 ~$100 - ~$103 Info Services Multiple Expansion (3) Trading Multiple Source: FactSet (11/6/2020), Company filings 1. Trading multiple based on 2/20/2020 closing price of $51.50 and midpoint of 2020 guidance issued on 2/19/2020; trading multiple based on midpoint of 2020 guidance at the time immediately prior to the launch of the hostile proposal 5 2. Multiple implied by Senator/Cannae’s initial $65/share proposal and 2020E Management guidance midpoint adjusted EBITDA (~$513m) at the time immediately prior to the launch of the hostile proposal 3. Peer group consists of CoStar, Dun & Bradstreet, Equifax, Experian, Fair Isaac, IHS Markit, RELX, Thomson Reuters, TransUnion, Verisk and Wolters Kluwer; lowest multiple of 15.1x based on Equifax; see page 18 for additional detailsCoreLogic Is Far More Valuable Than Senator/Cannae’s Lowball Proposal CoreLogic’s Board was clearly correct in determining that Senator/Cannae’s proposal significantly undervalued the Company – and by rejecting it, has generated interest more in-line with the value of the Company ($ in millions) 2020 Adjusted 2020 Adjusted Implied Share Price EBITDA Guidance EBITDA Multiple Value at Historical ~11.3x Trading Multiples and $615 - $630 Pre-COVID and pre-proposal ~$71 - ~$73 (1) Trading Multiple No Takeover Premium Senator/Cannae ~13.4x (2) Multiple Applied to $615 - $630 Implied Multiple of ~$86 - ~$89 Hostile Proposal CoreLogic EBITDA ~15.1x Upside Case From Lowest $615 - $630 ~$100 - ~$103 Info Services Multiple Expansion (3) Trading Multiple Source: FactSet (11/6/2020), Company filings 1. Trading multiple based on 2/20/2020 closing price of $51.50 and midpoint of 2020 guidance issued on 2/19/2020; trading multiple based on midpoint of 2020 guidance at the time immediately prior to the launch of the hostile proposal 5 2. Multiple implied by Senator/Cannae’s initial $65/share proposal and 2020E Management guidance midpoint adjusted EBITDA (~$513m) at the time immediately prior to the launch of the hostile proposal 3. Peer group consists of CoStar, Dun & Bradstreet, Equifax, Experian, Fair Isaac, IHS Markit, RELX, Thomson Reuters, TransUnion, Verisk and Wolters Kluwer; lowest multiple of 15.1x based on Equifax; see page 18 for additional details


Sell-Side Price Targets Confirm Values up to $80 per Share CoreLogic has raised its 2020 adjusted EBITDA guidance by ~$110 million, an increase of more than 20%, since Senator/Cannae made their unsolicited proposal $80 Analyst price targets $72 have increased to a median of $72 and $70 go up to $80 $67 Senator / $65 Cannae’s $66 Proposal Post Q2 Post FY20 Post Q2 Release Guidance Raise Guidance Raise (7/23/20 - 9/21/20) Current (6/26/20 - 7/6/20) (7/7/20 - 7/22/20) Note: Data based on median of all published price targets during the respective time periods 6Sell-Side Price Targets Confirm Values up to $80 per Share CoreLogic has raised its 2020 adjusted EBITDA guidance by ~$110 million, an increase of more than 20%, since Senator/Cannae made their unsolicited proposal $80 Analyst price targets $72 have increased to a median of $72 and $70 go up to $80 $67 Senator / $65 Cannae’s $66 Proposal Post Q2 Post FY20 Post Q2 Release Guidance Raise Guidance Raise (7/23/20 - 9/21/20) Current (6/26/20 - 7/6/20) (7/7/20 - 7/22/20) Note: Data based on median of all published price targets during the respective time periods 6


Our Board Has Positioned the Company to Maximize Value CoreLogic’s Board Senator/Cannae ü Has been transparent, responsive and solicited Ð Urged shareholders to accept a lowball $66 per share interest, in line with shareholder input proposal ü Appointed four new directors in last three years Ð Urged us to start an auction at a low price, which ü Is comprised of diverse directors would have resulted in much lower proposals than CoreLogic’s Board obtained ü Has proven track records of M&A Ð Nominated directors with little to no industry expertise ü Conducting a strategic review designed to maximize value for shareholders Ð Criticized the Company’s projections, which have since proven to be correct ü Shielded shareholders from the value destruction of Senator’s lowball proposal, and generated significant Ð Talked down CoreLogic’s value to support its low interest from a number of parties at $80+, a $1bn+ proposal improvement from Senator/Cannae’s proposal Who will do a better job of protecting your investment and maximizing value? CoreLogic’s Board has already demonstrated a clear commitment to shareholder value creation and is accountable to all shareholders at the upcoming 2021 annual meeting 7Our Board Has Positioned the Company to Maximize Value CoreLogic’s Board Senator/Cannae ü Has been transparent, responsive and solicited Ð Urged shareholders to accept a lowball $66 per share interest, in line with shareholder input proposal ü Appointed four new directors in last three years Ð Urged us to start an auction at a low price, which ü Is comprised of diverse directors would have resulted in much lower proposals than CoreLogic’s Board obtained ü Has proven track records of M&A Ð Nominated directors with little to no industry expertise ü Conducting a strategic review designed to maximize value for shareholders Ð Criticized the Company’s projections, which have since proven to be correct ü Shielded shareholders from the value destruction of Senator’s lowball proposal, and generated significant Ð Talked down CoreLogic’s value to support its low interest from a number of parties at $80+, a $1bn+ proposal improvement from Senator/Cannae’s proposal Who will do a better job of protecting your investment and maximizing value? CoreLogic’s Board has already demonstrated a clear commitment to shareholder value creation and is accountable to all shareholders at the upcoming 2021 annual meeting 7


Our Performance Is At a Record Level With An Established Path to Value Upside in 2021 and BeyondOur Performance Is At a Record Level With An Established Path to Value Upside in 2021 and Beyond


Our Data and Digital Platforms Help Millions of People Find, Buy and Protect Homes Every Year Our solutions power major housing finance and insurance companies globally Market Trends & Insights• Revenue mix 55% housing finance and ~45% non-mortgage; ~95%+ Property & Portfolio recurring Intelligence Property Listing & Marketing Services Find. • Unique scale and reach with significant addressable TAM for Property Insurance upside as evidenced by our Portfolio Risk Solutions Monitoring insurance, international and other Property Valuation non-mortgage growth Buy. Protect. Climate & Location Risk Monitoring Property Tax Solutions 8Our Data and Digital Platforms Help Millions of People Find, Buy and Protect Homes Every Year Our solutions power major housing finance and insurance companies globally Market Trends & Insights• Revenue mix 55% housing finance and ~45% non-mortgage; ~95%+ Property & Portfolio recurring Intelligence Property Listing & Marketing Services Find. • Unique scale and reach with significant addressable TAM for Property Insurance upside as evidenced by our Portfolio Risk Solutions Monitoring insurance, international and other Property Valuation non-mortgage growth Buy. Protect. Climate & Location Risk Monitoring Property Tax Solutions 8


CoreLogic Is Delivering Results… 3 straight quarters of outperformance, 2020 guidance increases of ~$225mm for revenue and ~$110mm for adjusted EBITDA and clear line-of-sight into 2021 growth Before Senator / (1) Current Change Cannae Proposal ($ in millions) 2020E Revenue Guidance $1,690 - $1,730 $1,920 - $1,945 +13% 2020E Adjusted EBITDA Guidance $500 - $525 $615 - $630 +21% 2020E Adjusted EBITDA Margin (2) ~30% ~36% +~600 bps Guidance 2021E Adjusted EBITDA (4) $508 $613 +21% (3) Consensus Source: FactSet, Wall Street Research, Company filings 1. Based on midpoint of guidance ranges where applicable 2. Reflects previous guidance issued on September 22, 2020, adjusted to exclude discontinued operations 9 3. Based on estimates from Baird, Barclays, Compass Point, Deutsche Bank, KBW, Stephens, Truist, Wells Fargo, Wolfe and Zelman 4. Reflects previous guidance issued on September 22, 2020CoreLogic Is Delivering Results… 3 straight quarters of outperformance, 2020 guidance increases of ~$225mm for revenue and ~$110mm for adjusted EBITDA and clear line-of-sight into 2021 growth Before Senator / (1) Current Change Cannae Proposal ($ in millions) 2020E Revenue Guidance $1,690 - $1,730 $1,920 - $1,945 +13% 2020E Adjusted EBITDA Guidance $500 - $525 $615 - $630 +21% 2020E Adjusted EBITDA Margin (2) ~30% ~36% +~600 bps Guidance 2021E Adjusted EBITDA (4) $508 $613 +21% (3) Consensus Source: FactSet, Wall Street Research, Company filings 1. Based on midpoint of guidance ranges where applicable 2. Reflects previous guidance issued on September 22, 2020, adjusted to exclude discontinued operations 9 3. Based on estimates from Baird, Barclays, Compass Point, Deutsche Bank, KBW, Stephens, Truist, Wells Fargo, Wolfe and Zelman 4. Reflects previous guidance issued on September 22, 2020


...And Delivers on Its Commitments We have met or beat our adjusted EBITDA guidance range in all 13 quarters since we began issuing quarterly guidance FY17 FY18 FY19 FY20 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 PPPPPPPPPPPPP Midpoint “We think the co's 5% C21 organic rev growth outlook could be conservative” (1) – (October 23, 2020) 1. Permission to use quotes neither sought nor obtained 10 Adjusted EBITDA Guidance Range...And Delivers on Its Commitments We have met or beat our adjusted EBITDA guidance range in all 13 quarters since we began issuing quarterly guidance FY17 FY18 FY19 FY20 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 PPPPPPPPPPPPP Midpoint “We think the co's 5% C21 organic rev growth outlook could be conservative” (1) – (October 23, 2020) 1. Permission to use quotes neither sought nor obtained 10 Adjusted EBITDA Guidance Range


Our Strategy and Investments Drive Valuation Upside for 2021 and Beyond Increasing Non-Mortgage Revenue Mix (1) (1) ~50% ~95% Stable Revenue Base ~45% Single ~40% Recurring ~35% Digits with Reduced Cyclicality Revenue 2011 2018 Today 2021E 2022E Consistent Track Record of Growth Visibility Into Mid to High-Single FY 2011 – FY 2020E Digit Organic Revenue Growth (2) Sustainable 6% Revenue CAGR New Business Wins (2) Growth 11% Adjusted EBITDA CAGR Share Gains (2) 22% Adjusted EPS CAGR New Products and Solutions Expanding 1,000+ bps ~40 bps Adjusted EBITDA Of margin expansion Additional annual margin since 2011 expansion expected Margins $2bn+ $1bn 50% 55-65% Strong of capital returned from repurchase plan dividend increase in free cash flow 2011 through the announced in Q2 2020 conversion over Capital Return (3) end of 2020 Q2 2020 the last five years 1. Reflects elimination of discontinued operations 11 2. From FY 2011 – FY 2020E; based on midpoint of FY 2020 guidance; does not reflect impact of announced divestitures or $1bn share repurchase program 3. Includes $500mm planned share repurchases during 2H 2020Our Strategy and Investments Drive Valuation Upside for 2021 and Beyond Increasing Non-Mortgage Revenue Mix (1) (1) ~50% ~95% Stable Revenue Base ~45% Single ~40% Recurring ~35% Digits with Reduced Cyclicality Revenue 2011 2018 Today 2021E 2022E Consistent Track Record of Growth Visibility Into Mid to High-Single FY 2011 – FY 2020E Digit Organic Revenue Growth (2) Sustainable 6% Revenue CAGR New Business Wins (2) Growth 11% Adjusted EBITDA CAGR Share Gains (2) 22% Adjusted EPS CAGR New Products and Solutions Expanding 1,000+ bps ~40 bps Adjusted EBITDA Of margin expansion Additional annual margin since 2011 expansion expected Margins $2bn+ $1bn 50% 55-65% Strong of capital returned from repurchase plan dividend increase in free cash flow 2011 through the announced in Q2 2020 conversion over Capital Return (3) end of 2020 Q2 2020 the last five years 1. Reflects elimination of discontinued operations 11 2. From FY 2011 – FY 2020E; based on midpoint of FY 2020 guidance; does not reflect impact of announced divestitures or $1bn share repurchase program 3. Includes $500mm planned share repurchases during 2H 2020


Shareholders Should Benefit From Ongoing Value Creation Œ Demonstrably accelerating growth with strength in our non-mortgage business  Clear line of sight to deliver 2021 guidance Ž Macro trends provide multi-year tailwind to our business  Highly recurring revenue increases visibility and reduces cyclicality  Significant return of capital, with more to come 12Shareholders Should Benefit From Ongoing Value Creation Œ Demonstrably accelerating growth with strength in our non-mortgage business  Clear line of sight to deliver 2021 guidance Ž Macro trends provide multi-year tailwind to our business  Highly recurring revenue increases visibility and reduces cyclicality  Significant return of capital, with more to come 12


Œ Demonstrably Accelerating Growth With Strength In Our Non-Mortgage Business (1) YoY Revenue Growth (Cont. Ops) • Year-to-date organic growth of ~5.5%, consistent with 2021 forecasted growth rate 23% • Broad-based market share gains secured across mortgage and non-mortgage • Expanded client solutions and new product revenue 15% growth in mortgage and real estate 14% 13% (2) • Strategic “mega” wins in insurance & spatial and tax 8% 5% 5% payment processing 3% • Contributed over 30% of Q3 organic growth • Revenue from new contracted wins will significantly ramp up in 2021 • Liberty Mutual win serves as a catalyst to significantly grow 4Q 19 1Q 20 2Q 20 3Q 20 Total Revenue Growth Rate Organic Growth Rate our insurance footprint We forecast 5% organic growth in 2021 and 2022 1. Total growth rates are pro forma for previously announced AMC transformation program, exit of non-core default technology operations, and impact of COVID-19 13 2. We define “Mega” wins as contracts in excess of one year in duration and greater than $10 million in total revenue Œ Demonstrably Accelerating Growth With Strength In Our Non-Mortgage Business (1) YoY Revenue Growth (Cont. Ops) • Year-to-date organic growth of ~5.5%, consistent with 2021 forecasted growth rate 23% • Broad-based market share gains secured across mortgage and non-mortgage • Expanded client solutions and new product revenue 15% growth in mortgage and real estate 14% 13% (2) • Strategic “mega” wins in insurance & spatial and tax 8% 5% 5% payment processing 3% • Contributed over 30% of Q3 organic growth • Revenue from new contracted wins will significantly ramp up in 2021 • Liberty Mutual win serves as a catalyst to significantly grow 4Q 19 1Q 20 2Q 20 3Q 20 Total Revenue Growth Rate Organic Growth Rate our insurance footprint We forecast 5% organic growth in 2021 and 2022 1. Total growth rates are pro forma for previously announced AMC transformation program, exit of non-core default technology operations, and impact of COVID-19 13 2. We define “Mega” wins as contracts in excess of one year in duration and greater than $10 million in total revenue


 Clear Line Of Sight To Deliver 2021 Guidance ($ in millions) ~3% ~5% / Overall Organic Growth Growth $1,585 - $1,630 $1,550 - $1,575 $15 - $20 ($55) - ($45) $75 - $80 Majority of 10-15% Over 60% of expected COVID contraction in 2021 growth impact not U.S. mortgage target secured directly tied to market expected by 2020 YTD U.S. mortgage in 2021 contract wins volume 2020 Revenue Expected U.S. Mortgage Organic 2021 Revenue Guidance COVID Recovery Market Growth Guidance 14 Clear Line Of Sight To Deliver 2021 Guidance ($ in millions) ~3% ~5% / Overall Organic Growth Growth $1,585 - $1,630 $1,550 - $1,575 $15 - $20 ($55) - ($45) $75 - $80 Majority of 10-15% Over 60% of expected COVID contraction in 2021 growth impact not U.S. mortgage target secured directly tied to market expected by 2020 YTD U.S. mortgage in 2021 contract wins volume 2020 Revenue Expected U.S. Mortgage Organic 2021 Revenue Guidance COVID Recovery Market Growth Guidance 14


Ž Macro Trends Provide Multi-Year Tailwind To Our Business ...And Will Likely Remain That Way Through 2023 Mortgage Rates Are at Historic Lows... With The Fed On Hold... (1) 30-yr Fixed-Rate Mortgage (2) Fed Funds Rate Projections (%) 0.2 6% 4% 4.0% 0.1% 0.1 2.8% 2% 0% 0.0 Dec-17 Jul-18 Feb-19 Sep-19 Apr-20 Oct-20 Jan-20 Jan-21 Jan-22 Jan-23 ...and Even One of Bill Foley’s Companies Estimates That There Are a Historically High Number of Mortgage Refinancing Candidates That Should Provide Years of Demand (3) Black Knight Forecast of Refinance Candidates (millions) “While the housing market undoubtedly has felt the effects of COVID-19, 25 we are encouraged by recent homebuyer demand as well as mortgage rates that should remain at record lows for the foreseeable future” 20 (4) - Sam Khater, Chief Economist, Freddie Mac (Jun 2020) 15 “There are still nearly 18 million homeowners with good credit and at 10 least 20% equity who stand to cut at least 0.75% off their current first 5 lien rate by refinancing” (4) - Ben Graboske, Black Knight Data & Analytics President (Sep 2020) 0 Sep-19 Nov-19 Dec-19 Feb-20 Mar-20May-20 Jul-20 Aug-20 Oct-20 1. Freddie Mac (10/31/20) 2. Based on most recent Federal Open Market Committee meeting (9/17) 15 3. Black Knight Mortgage Monitor (September 2020) 4. Permission to use quotes neither sought nor obtainedŽ Macro Trends Provide Multi-Year Tailwind To Our Business ...And Will Likely Remain That Way Through 2023 Mortgage Rates Are at Historic Lows... With The Fed On Hold... (1) 30-yr Fixed-Rate Mortgage (2) Fed Funds Rate Projections (%) 0.2 6% 4% 4.0% 0.1% 0.1 2.8% 2% 0% 0.0 Dec-17 Jul-18 Feb-19 Sep-19 Apr-20 Oct-20 Jan-20 Jan-21 Jan-22 Jan-23 ...and Even One of Bill Foley’s Companies Estimates That There Are a Historically High Number of Mortgage Refinancing Candidates That Should Provide Years of Demand (3) Black Knight Forecast of Refinance Candidates (millions) “While the housing market undoubtedly has felt the effects of COVID-19, 25 we are encouraged by recent homebuyer demand as well as mortgage rates that should remain at record lows for the foreseeable future” 20 (4) - Sam Khater, Chief Economist, Freddie Mac (Jun 2020) 15 “There are still nearly 18 million homeowners with good credit and at 10 least 20% equity who stand to cut at least 0.75% off their current first 5 lien rate by refinancing” (4) - Ben Graboske, Black Knight Data & Analytics President (Sep 2020) 0 Sep-19 Nov-19 Dec-19 Feb-20 Mar-20May-20 Jul-20 Aug-20 Oct-20 1. Freddie Mac (10/31/20) 2. Based on most recent Federal Open Market Committee meeting (9/17) 15 3. Black Knight Mortgage Monitor (September 2020) 4. Permission to use quotes neither sought nor obtained


 Highly Recurring Revenue Increases Visibility and Reduces Cyclicality (1) Revenue Mix • Long-term customer relationships with ~95% of exceptionally high renewal rates: Revenue is Recurring • Our data is deeply embedded in customer workflows • Recurring revenue is one year or greater • Overwhelming majority of contracts are multi-year or evergreen arrangements 55% Recurring fixed 40% (1) [ [X X] ]% % • Since prior year : Recurring (2 (2) ) [X]% R Recu ecur rr ri in ng g [X va ]% riable (2) Recurring • Recurring fixed revenue increased to 55% from 45% (2) Recurring • Percentage of revenues from non-mortgage increased to ~45% from 40% 5% Non-recurring 1. Reflects divestiture of reseller businesses 16 Highly Recurring Revenue Increases Visibility and Reduces Cyclicality (1) Revenue Mix • Long-term customer relationships with ~95% of exceptionally high renewal rates: Revenue is Recurring • Our data is deeply embedded in customer workflows • Recurring revenue is one year or greater • Overwhelming majority of contracts are multi-year or evergreen arrangements 55% Recurring fixed 40% (1) [ [X X] ]% % • Since prior year : Recurring (2 (2) ) [X]% R Recu ecur rr ri in ng g [X va ]% riable (2) Recurring • Recurring fixed revenue increased to 55% from 45% (2) Recurring • Percentage of revenues from non-mortgage increased to ~45% from 40% 5% Non-recurring 1. Reflects divestiture of reseller businesses 16


5  Significant Return of Capital, With More To Come Total Capital Returned ($ in millions) • $1bn share repurchase program • $500 million in FY 2020 Prior Cumulative (3) ~2,738 ~289 Periodic • $300 million in FY 2021 ~2,449 Projected (2) • $200 million in FY 2022 ~393 ~2,056 • Quarterly dividend recently increased by 50% (1) ~595 1,461 1,374 1,265 • Consistently deliver 55-65% free cash flow 1,058 conversion 863 • 73% over 12 months ending Q3 2020 766 674 433 • Leverage of 2.5x and significant cash on hand 207 provide additional firepower 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020E 2021E 2022E 1. Assumes $44m of completed share repurchases and dividends in 1H 2020 and ~$551m of forecasted share repurchases (~$500m) and dividends (~$51m) in H2 2020 17 2. Assumes ~$300m of forecasted share repurchases and ~$93m of dividends in 2021 3. Assumes ~$200m of forecasted share repurchases and ~$89m of dividends in 20225  Significant Return of Capital, With More To Come Total Capital Returned ($ in millions) • $1bn share repurchase program • $500 million in FY 2020 Prior Cumulative (3) ~2,738 ~289 Periodic • $300 million in FY 2021 ~2,449 Projected (2) • $200 million in FY 2022 ~393 ~2,056 • Quarterly dividend recently increased by 50% (1) ~595 1,461 1,374 1,265 • Consistently deliver 55-65% free cash flow 1,058 conversion 863 • 73% over 12 months ending Q3 2020 766 674 433 • Leverage of 2.5x and significant cash on hand 207 provide additional firepower 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020E 2021E 2022E 1. Assumes $44m of completed share repurchases and dividends in 1H 2020 and ~$551m of forecasted share repurchases (~$500m) and dividends (~$51m) in H2 2020 17 2. Assumes ~$300m of forecasted share repurchases and ~$93m of dividends in 2021 3. Assumes ~$200m of forecasted share repurchases and ~$89m of dividends in 2022


CoreLogic’s Transformation Has Positioned Us For A Multiple Re-RatingCoreLogic’s Transformation Has Positioned Us For A Multiple Re-Rating


Our Transformation Into A Leading Info Services Provider Warrants A Multiple Re-Rating... Our Financial Profile Already Meets or We Meet The Criteria of a Leading Info Services Provider Exceeds Info Services Median 2019A – 2022E Revenue CAGR #1 property data provider to a ~$34 trillion (2) 7% CoreLogic Cont. Ops: 13% Leadership Position in a (1) market . Long-term customer relationships Info Svcs Median: 5% 8% Large and Growing Market 7% 7% 5% 5% 3% 3% with exceptionally high renewal rates 2% 2% 1% (3) (4) (4) CSGP EFX FICO VRSK EXPN TRU TRI INFO DNB WKL REL 2020E Adjusted EBITDA Margin (5) 36% adjusted EBITDA margin for continuing Scale Economies and (5) CoreLogic Cont. Ops: 36% ops with visibility into continued margin Resilient Business Model Info Svcs Median: 34% expansion 50% 43% 41% 38% 35% 34% 34% 34% 32% 32% 30% VRSK INFO DNB TRU EFX EXPN FICO REL TRI CSGP WKL Mid to upper single-digit growth with ~95% Recurring and TEV/2020E Adjusted EBITDA Multiple recurring revenue and Growing Revenue (6) approaching ~50% non-mortgage 62.1x CoreLogic: 12.0x Info Svcs Median: 22.0x 33.1x 25.8x 23.5x 23.0x 22.0x 19.4x 19.3x 16.4x 16.2x 15.1x Source: FactSet (11/6/2020), Company filings Note: CSGP = CoStar, DNB = Dun & Bradstreet, EFX = Equifax, EXPN = Experian, FICO = Fair Isaac, INFO = IHS Markit, REL = RELX, TRI = Thomson Reuters, TRU = TransUnion, VRSK = Verisk, WKL = Wolters Kluwer 1. Zillow estimate for the 2019 total U.S. housing market 2. 2019A includes a ~$70m adjustment related to the completion of the AMC transformation program and exit of non-core default technology CSGP FICO VRSK TRI EXPN INFO DNB TRU WKL REL EFX operations; 2022E reflects the midpoint of Management guidance, including discontinued operations 3. Pro forma for acquisitions of STR and Ten-X Commercial 4. Reflects fiscal year 2019A – 2022E revenue CAGR. All other metrics reflect calendar year-end financials 18 5. Reflects 2020E continuing operations adjusted EBITDA margin based on the midpoint of Management guidance 6. Adjusted EBITDA based on the midpoint of 2020E Management guidance including discontinued operationsOur Transformation Into A Leading Info Services Provider Warrants A Multiple Re-Rating... Our Financial Profile Already Meets or We Meet The Criteria of a Leading Info Services Provider Exceeds Info Services Median 2019A – 2022E Revenue CAGR #1 property data provider to a ~$34 trillion (2) 7% CoreLogic Cont. Ops: 13% Leadership Position in a (1) market . Long-term customer relationships Info Svcs Median: 5% 8% Large and Growing Market 7% 7% 5% 5% 3% 3% with exceptionally high renewal rates 2% 2% 1% (3) (4) (4) CSGP EFX FICO VRSK EXPN TRU TRI INFO DNB WKL REL 2020E Adjusted EBITDA Margin (5) 36% adjusted EBITDA margin for continuing Scale Economies and (5) CoreLogic Cont. Ops: 36% ops with visibility into continued margin Resilient Business Model Info Svcs Median: 34% expansion 50% 43% 41% 38% 35% 34% 34% 34% 32% 32% 30% VRSK INFO DNB TRU EFX EXPN FICO REL TRI CSGP WKL Mid to upper single-digit growth with ~95% Recurring and TEV/2020E Adjusted EBITDA Multiple recurring revenue and Growing Revenue (6) approaching ~50% non-mortgage 62.1x CoreLogic: 12.0x Info Svcs Median: 22.0x 33.1x 25.8x 23.5x 23.0x 22.0x 19.4x 19.3x 16.4x 16.2x 15.1x Source: FactSet (11/6/2020), Company filings Note: CSGP = CoStar, DNB = Dun & Bradstreet, EFX = Equifax, EXPN = Experian, FICO = Fair Isaac, INFO = IHS Markit, REL = RELX, TRI = Thomson Reuters, TRU = TransUnion, VRSK = Verisk, WKL = Wolters Kluwer 1. Zillow estimate for the 2019 total U.S. housing market 2. 2019A includes a ~$70m adjustment related to the completion of the AMC transformation program and exit of non-core default technology CSGP FICO VRSK TRI EXPN INFO DNB TRU WKL REL EFX operations; 2022E reflects the midpoint of Management guidance, including discontinued operations 3. Pro forma for acquisitions of STR and Ten-X Commercial 4. Reflects fiscal year 2019A – 2022E revenue CAGR. All other metrics reflect calendar year-end financials 18 5. Reflects 2020E continuing operations adjusted EBITDA margin based on the midpoint of Management guidance 6. Adjusted EBITDA based on the midpoint of 2020E Management guidance including discontinued operations


...Implying a Value Inline With Recent Third Party Indications of Interest ~$102 ~$93 ~$85 ~$77 Senator/Cannae ~$69 Proposal Price: ~$66 1 11.0x 12.0x 13.0x 14.0x 15.1x Lowest Info Services Trading Multiple Source: FactSet (11/6/2020), Company filings 19 1. Peer group consists of CoStar, Dun & Bradstreet, Equifax, Experian, Fair Isaac, IHS Markit, RELX, Thomson Reuters, TransUnion, Verisk and Wolters Kluwer; lowest multiple of 15.1x based on Equifax; see page 18 for additional details...Implying a Value Inline With Recent Third Party Indications of Interest ~$102 ~$93 ~$85 ~$77 Senator/Cannae ~$69 Proposal Price: ~$66 1 11.0x 12.0x 13.0x 14.0x 15.1x Lowest Info Services Trading Multiple Source: FactSet (11/6/2020), Company filings 19 1. Peer group consists of CoStar, Dun & Bradstreet, Equifax, Experian, Fair Isaac, IHS Markit, RELX, Thomson Reuters, TransUnion, Verisk and Wolters Kluwer; lowest multiple of 15.1x based on Equifax; see page 18 for additional details


Sell-Side Analysts Recognize CoreLogic’s Value Proposition “We reiterate our Buy and $80PT (12.2x C22E EBITDA). It is our view CoreLogic is executing better than in recent memory, driving share gains, better organic rev growth and EBITDA % expansion. We accordingly see multiple expansion, as reflected in our PT.” “We argue the sum of: 1) faster organic rev growth; 2) more defensible strategic position; 3) share gains; 4) modest pricing power; 5) robust op leverage and FCF; and 6) capital return argue for at-least-modest multiple expansion.” Price Target: $80 “We think the co's 5% C21 organic rev growth outlook could be conservative.” (1) -OCTOBER 23, 2020 “Following CLGX’s raised guide and presentation related to stronger market trends we raise our estimates slightly but maintain our valuation in the 12-13x EBITDA range. After speaking with management we came away incrementally constructive on 1) near-term flow-through opportunity from elevated refi levels, 2) potential for incremental traction in the Insurance segment following a first-of-its kind signing with a major client, and 3) margin expansion related to a higher quality revenue mix and productivity measures.” (1) Price Target: $77 -SEPTEMBER 23, 2020 “If CLGX is able to meet the high end of its 2021 revenue⁄EBITDA guidance, the stock could trade at a 1x premium to our 12x base case multiple and trade to $89⁄share.” (1) -OCTOBER 9, 2020 Price Target: $73 All together, we view the 2021 guidance as achievable given the backlog of announced client wins and our expectation for continued elevated refinance volume supporting UWS and operating leverage.” (1) -OCTOBER 23, 2020 Price Target: $70 “Even if the bid comes up empty, we do believe that CLGX will be better off as a company when the dust settles no matter the outcome as management has already put into motion several value creation drivers (strategy in place/tied to multiyear financial targets, cleaning up the core with necessary divestitures, turbo-charging innovation, more generous capital returns, etc.) all of which should have positive and lasting LT effects.” Price Target: $69 (1) -JULY 24, 2020 “CoreLogic posted strong Q3 results and the macro backdrop and new contract wins support positive momentum into year-end and 2021. In addition, the exiting of the credit business does remove market-related volatility from the company and has improved our forecast closer to the company’s adjusted guidance despite having a more cautious view of the origination outlook. Exiting of credit, a mid-teen margin business, also improves the financial profile of CLGX, which does warrant multiple reconsideration (higher multiple on lower EBITDA base). Taking this all into consideration, we have increased our EV/EBITDA multiple assessment for the company into the 13.0x – 14.0x range from ~12x and are estimating forward fair value in the mid- $70s.” (2) Price Target: $76 (1) -OCTOBER 23, 2020 1. Permission to use quotes neither sought nor obtained 20 2. Dowling & Partners does not provide a price target but notes the midpoint of their 12-month forward fair value of the stock is ~$76 per share in its most recent research reportSell-Side Analysts Recognize CoreLogic’s Value Proposition “We reiterate our Buy and $80PT (12.2x C22E EBITDA). It is our view CoreLogic is executing better than in recent memory, driving share gains, better organic rev growth and EBITDA % expansion. We accordingly see multiple expansion, as reflected in our PT.” “We argue the sum of: 1) faster organic rev growth; 2) more defensible strategic position; 3) share gains; 4) modest pricing power; 5) robust op leverage and FCF; and 6) capital return argue for at-least-modest multiple expansion.” Price Target: $80 “We think the co's 5% C21 organic rev growth outlook could be conservative.” (1) -OCTOBER 23, 2020 “Following CLGX’s raised guide and presentation related to stronger market trends we raise our estimates slightly but maintain our valuation in the 12-13x EBITDA range. After speaking with management we came away incrementally constructive on 1) near-term flow-through opportunity from elevated refi levels, 2) potential for incremental traction in the Insurance segment following a first-of-its kind signing with a major client, and 3) margin expansion related to a higher quality revenue mix and productivity measures.” (1) Price Target: $77 -SEPTEMBER 23, 2020 “If CLGX is able to meet the high end of its 2021 revenue⁄EBITDA guidance, the stock could trade at a 1x premium to our 12x base case multiple and trade to $89⁄share.” (1) -OCTOBER 9, 2020 Price Target: $73 All together, we view the 2021 guidance as achievable given the backlog of announced client wins and our expectation for continued elevated refinance volume supporting UWS and operating leverage.” (1) -OCTOBER 23, 2020 Price Target: $70 “Even if the bid comes up empty, we do believe that CLGX will be better off as a company when the dust settles no matter the outcome as management has already put into motion several value creation drivers (strategy in place/tied to multiyear financial targets, cleaning up the core with necessary divestitures, turbo-charging innovation, more generous capital returns, etc.) all of which should have positive and lasting LT effects.” Price Target: $69 (1) -JULY 24, 2020 “CoreLogic posted strong Q3 results and the macro backdrop and new contract wins support positive momentum into year-end and 2021. In addition, the exiting of the credit business does remove market-related volatility from the company and has improved our forecast closer to the company’s adjusted guidance despite having a more cautious view of the origination outlook. Exiting of credit, a mid-teen margin business, also improves the financial profile of CLGX, which does warrant multiple reconsideration (higher multiple on lower EBITDA base). Taking this all into consideration, we have increased our EV/EBITDA multiple assessment for the company into the 13.0x – 14.0x range from ~12x and are estimating forward fair value in the mid- $70s.” (2) Price Target: $76 (1) -OCTOBER 23, 2020 1. Permission to use quotes neither sought nor obtained 20 2. Dowling & Partners does not provide a price target but notes the midpoint of their 12-month forward fair value of the stock is ~$76 per share in its most recent research report


We Have Assembled A Fit-For- Purpose Board To Oversee Our Continued Execution And Evaluate All Pathways To ValueWe Have Assembled A Fit-For- Purpose Board To Oversee Our Continued Execution And Evaluate All Pathways To Value


Our Board Has Substantial Experience in Assessing and Delivering Shareholder Value… Paul F. Folino (C) $9.9bn $392mm $349mm $295mm $23mm sale to acquisition of acquisition of acquisition of acquisition of Former Chairman & CEO, Emulex $45mm Frank D. Martell $25mm $13mm $661mm $475mm $120mm $64mm Collateral acquisition of acquisition of acquisitions of acquisition of acquisition of acquisition of President & CEO, CoreLogic Solutions sale to $4.0bn Douglas C. Curling Principal & Managing Director, New Kent Capital sale to Treasury Services John C. Dorman $396mm Corporation $1.3bn sale to $127mm sale to acquisition of $120mm sale to Former Chairman & Interim CEO, Online Resources Vikrant Raina majority stake sale to acquisition of acquisition of acquisition of CEO & Managing Partner, BV Investment Partners $2.7bn $977mm Jaynie Miller Studenmund $5.6bn sale to $5.2bn sale to $2.1bn sale to $1.9bn sale to acquisition of acquisition of Former COO, Overture Services $141mm David F. Walker Former Partner, Arthur Andersen sale to 21Our Board Has Substantial Experience in Assessing and Delivering Shareholder Value… Paul F. Folino (C) $9.9bn $392mm $349mm $295mm $23mm sale to acquisition of acquisition of acquisition of acquisition of Former Chairman & CEO, Emulex $45mm Frank D. Martell $25mm $13mm $661mm $475mm $120mm $64mm Collateral acquisition of acquisition of acquisitions of acquisition of acquisition of acquisition of President & CEO, CoreLogic Solutions sale to $4.0bn Douglas C. Curling Principal & Managing Director, New Kent Capital sale to Treasury Services John C. Dorman $396mm Corporation $1.3bn sale to $127mm sale to acquisition of $120mm sale to Former Chairman & Interim CEO, Online Resources Vikrant Raina majority stake sale to acquisition of acquisition of acquisition of CEO & Managing Partner, BV Investment Partners $2.7bn $977mm Jaynie Miller Studenmund $5.6bn sale to $5.2bn sale to $2.1bn sale to $1.9bn sale to acquisition of acquisition of Former COO, Overture Services $141mm David F. Walker Former Partner, Arthur Andersen sale to 21


…And the Right Experience & Expertise to Guide Our Strategy Public Company Insurance/ Director Financial/M&A Private Equity/ Investing CEO/CFO/COO Real Estate/ Technology Paul F. FolinoPPP Frank D. Martell PPPP J. David ChathamPPP Douglas C. CurlingPPPP John C. Dorman PPPP Claudia Fan MuncePPP Thomas C. O’BrienPPP Pamela H. PatenaudeP Vikrant RainaPPP J. Michael Shepherd PP Jaynie Miller StudenmundPPP David F. WalkerPP 7 of 12 Directors 12 of 12 Directors 9 of 12 Directors 7 of 12 Directors 22…And the Right Experience & Expertise to Guide Our Strategy Public Company Insurance/ Director Financial/M&A Private Equity/ Investing CEO/CFO/COO Real Estate/ Technology Paul F. FolinoPPP Frank D. Martell PPPP J. David ChathamPPP Douglas C. CurlingPPPP John C. Dorman PPPP Claudia Fan MuncePPP Thomas C. O’BrienPPP Pamela H. PatenaudeP Vikrant RainaPPP J. Michael Shepherd PP Jaynie Miller StudenmundPPP David F. WalkerPP 7 of 12 Directors 12 of 12 Directors 9 of 12 Directors 7 of 12 Directors 22


Our Board Plays A Critical Role In Oversight Shareholder-Friendly Governance… …Coupled With Effective Oversight ü Robust, independent oversight – 11 of 12 directors Independent Chairman are independent Annually-elected directors ü Committed to thoughtful refreshment, including four new independent directors added in past three years Shareholders may act by written consent ü Fully independent Audit, Compensation and Shareholders can call special meetings Nominating and Corporate Governance Committees Opted out of Section 203 of ü The Board regularly holds executive sessions without Delaware General Corporation Law management team members present Majority voting standard ü CoreLogic Board is held responsible for overseeing key business risks and regulating management Compensation correlated with performance – CEO pay processes was 0.87x the peer median ü Directors regularly achieve 98%+ support from Short-term shareholder rights plan shareholders for election 23Our Board Plays A Critical Role In Oversight Shareholder-Friendly Governance… …Coupled With Effective Oversight ü Robust, independent oversight – 11 of 12 directors Independent Chairman are independent Annually-elected directors ü Committed to thoughtful refreshment, including four new independent directors added in past three years Shareholders may act by written consent ü Fully independent Audit, Compensation and Shareholders can call special meetings Nominating and Corporate Governance Committees Opted out of Section 203 of ü The Board regularly holds executive sessions without Delaware General Corporation Law management team members present Majority voting standard ü CoreLogic Board is held responsible for overseeing key business risks and regulating management Compensation correlated with performance – CEO pay processes was 0.87x the peer median ü Directors regularly achieve 98%+ support from Short-term shareholder rights plan shareholders for election 23


Our Board Is Independent, Engaged And Highly Qualified Frank D. Martell J. David Chatham Douglas C. Curling Paul F. Folino (C) President & CEO, President & CEO, Principal & Managing Former Chairman & CEO, CoreLogic Chatham Holdings Director, New Kent Capital Emulex • Significant expertise in information • Internal executive leadership capacities • Significant experience in real estate • Operational background and board technology and intellectual property for 8+ years with deep understanding of mortgage, experience with deep knowledge of • Strong executive background• Intimate knowledge of Company home building, brokerages, valuation operating a publicly traded data • Extensive public company director culture, operations, strategy, financial and appraisals and residential and business, the insurance industry, data experience and competitive position commercial real estate markets monetization and growth strategies • Broad executive and board experience Pamela H. Patenaude John C. Dorman Claudia Fan Munce Thomas C. O’Brien Former Deputy Secretary, Former Chairman & Venture Advisor, Former President & CEO, U.S. Department of Housing CEO, Digital Insight New Enterprise Associates Insurance Auto Auctions and Urban Development • Valuable insights on operational, • Experience in identifying, acquiring and • Valued management insights from prior • Relevant insight and expertise from a technology and growth strategies, the selling emerging technologies and CEO experience career focused on housing policy and financial innovation space and board helping firms advance growth via • Leadership skills, board experience and community development logistics as prior CEO of a technology technology, innovation and strategy background in corporate governance service provider during rapid growth • Certified as a cybersecurity oversight • Extensive insurance expertise and expansion director by the NACD J. Michael Shepherd Vikrant Raina Jaynie Miller Studenmund David F. Walker Chairman and Former CEO & Managing Partner, Former President & COO, Former Partner, President & CEO, BV Investment Partners PayMyBills Arthur Andersen Bank of the West • Experience in identifying, acquiring and • Unique perspective via combination of • Executive operating experience with • CPA and certified fraud examiner with selling emerging technologies and former public service, regulatory and fast growing, innovative companies extensive experience in public helping firms advance growth financial housing policy experience, as • Extensive public director experience accounting and on public company • Knowledge of technology and data well as top-tier commercial and retail boards services, business services, risk banking leadership• Expertise in financial reporting, controls management and investment strategies and risk management 24 Four Recent Additions to Board (C) = Independent ChairmanOur Board Is Independent, Engaged And Highly Qualified Frank D. Martell J. David Chatham Douglas C. Curling Paul F. Folino (C) President & CEO, President & CEO, Principal & Managing Former Chairman & CEO, CoreLogic Chatham Holdings Director, New Kent Capital Emulex • Significant expertise in information • Internal executive leadership capacities • Significant experience in real estate • Operational background and board technology and intellectual property for 8+ years with deep understanding of mortgage, experience with deep knowledge of • Strong executive background• Intimate knowledge of Company home building, brokerages, valuation operating a publicly traded data • Extensive public company director culture, operations, strategy, financial and appraisals and residential and business, the insurance industry, data experience and competitive position commercial real estate markets monetization and growth strategies • Broad executive and board experience Pamela H. Patenaude John C. Dorman Claudia Fan Munce Thomas C. O’Brien Former Deputy Secretary, Former Chairman & Venture Advisor, Former President & CEO, U.S. Department of Housing CEO, Digital Insight New Enterprise Associates Insurance Auto Auctions and Urban Development • Valuable insights on operational, • Experience in identifying, acquiring and • Valued management insights from prior • Relevant insight and expertise from a technology and growth strategies, the selling emerging technologies and CEO experience career focused on housing policy and financial innovation space and board helping firms advance growth via • Leadership skills, board experience and community development logistics as prior CEO of a technology technology, innovation and strategy background in corporate governance service provider during rapid growth • Certified as a cybersecurity oversight • Extensive insurance expertise and expansion director by the NACD J. Michael Shepherd Vikrant Raina Jaynie Miller Studenmund David F. Walker Chairman and Former CEO & Managing Partner, Former President & COO, Former Partner, President & CEO, BV Investment Partners PayMyBills Arthur Andersen Bank of the West • Experience in identifying, acquiring and • Unique perspective via combination of • Executive operating experience with • CPA and certified fraud examiner with selling emerging technologies and former public service, regulatory and fast growing, innovative companies extensive experience in public helping firms advance growth financial housing policy experience, as • Extensive public director experience accounting and on public company • Knowledge of technology and data well as top-tier commercial and retail boards services, business services, risk banking leadership• Expertise in financial reporting, controls management and investment strategies and risk management 24 Four Recent Additions to Board (C) = Independent Chairman


Senator/Cannae’s Nominees Have Questionable Track Records That Would Put Shareholder Value At RiskSenator/Cannae’s Nominees Have Questionable Track Records That Would Put Shareholder Value At Risk


Senator/Cannae’s Nominees Are Unqualified and Aligned Themselves to a Clearly Inadequate Proposal • If you were constructing a Board, would you select individuals with the backgrounds and track records of Senator/Cannae’s slate? • Previous professional histories of working with the same individuals who put forward and subsequently abandoned a clearly inadequate proposal • No relevant industry experience • Limited experience serving on public company boards with the size and scale of CoreLogic • Involved with companies subject to serious investigations and litigation on issues ranging from manipulative marketing tactics, deceptive disclosures, and poorly-executed M&A to breach of fiduciary duty, amongst others • In constructing our Board, we have selected individuals with the right expertise to lead a company in our sector and a demonstrable track record of long-term value creation for shareholders • Apply a diverse skillset including in public executive leadership, insurance, real estate, technology, finance, M&A, private equity and investing • Have overseen the transformation of our business into one with a stable revenue base with reduced cyclicality, mid-to-high single (1) digit revenue growth, ~36% margins and strong capital returns • Executing a strategic review that has generated indications of interest at $80+, $14+ higher than Senator/Cannae’s lowball bid Why would you give Board representation to parties who were aligned with a $66 bid, when the CoreLogic Board has solicited interest at $80+? 1. Reflects previous guidance issued on September 22, 2020, adjusted to exclude discontinued operations 25Senator/Cannae’s Nominees Are Unqualified and Aligned Themselves to a Clearly Inadequate Proposal • If you were constructing a Board, would you select individuals with the backgrounds and track records of Senator/Cannae’s slate? • Previous professional histories of working with the same individuals who put forward and subsequently abandoned a clearly inadequate proposal • No relevant industry experience • Limited experience serving on public company boards with the size and scale of CoreLogic • Involved with companies subject to serious investigations and litigation on issues ranging from manipulative marketing tactics, deceptive disclosures, and poorly-executed M&A to breach of fiduciary duty, amongst others • In constructing our Board, we have selected individuals with the right expertise to lead a company in our sector and a demonstrable track record of long-term value creation for shareholders • Apply a diverse skillset including in public executive leadership, insurance, real estate, technology, finance, M&A, private equity and investing • Have overseen the transformation of our business into one with a stable revenue base with reduced cyclicality, mid-to-high single (1) digit revenue growth, ~36% margins and strong capital returns • Executing a strategic review that has generated indications of interest at $80+, $14+ higher than Senator/Cannae’s lowball bid Why would you give Board representation to parties who were aligned with a $66 bid, when the CoreLogic Board has solicited interest at $80+? 1. Reflects previous guidance issued on September 22, 2020, adjusted to exclude discontinued operations 25


Senator/Cannae’s Nominees Lack Experience and Expertise û Proxy advisor voted against her û No apparent financial re-election at Morningstar due to services, management or concerns regarding Audit û Involved in a significant operating experience Committee risk oversight post-acquisition write-û Director and audit down following committee member at Landis Cypress’ acquisition of Tyco during the major Spansion in 2014 scandal û Unsuccessful board Bradford nominee on at least five occasions Lane Albrecht û No experience serving on boards similar in size to Lack of CLGX’s board Industry û Sued for breach of fiduciary Extensive Experience duties as CEO of AMCOL Litigation History McKendrick Poor Winship TSR History Poor Corporate û Appointed to Governance History Bunge’s Board Rabin in connection to û No apparent financial services, an activist management or operating experience campaign from Wardell Ravi D.E. Shaw, when Senator’s û Connection to Cary û Served as a director at RLJ Quentin Koffey Thompson, director of Entertainment, where served as Head FNF and banker to Foley Senator was an investor of Activism network companies prior to its IPO in 2012 26Senator/Cannae’s Nominees Lack Experience and Expertise û Proxy advisor voted against her û No apparent financial re-election at Morningstar due to services, management or concerns regarding Audit û Involved in a significant operating experience Committee risk oversight post-acquisition write-û Director and audit down following committee member at Landis Cypress’ acquisition of Tyco during the major Spansion in 2014 scandal û Unsuccessful board Bradford nominee on at least five occasions Lane Albrecht û No experience serving on boards similar in size to Lack of CLGX’s board Industry û Sued for breach of fiduciary Extensive Experience duties as CEO of AMCOL Litigation History McKendrick Poor Winship TSR History Poor Corporate û Appointed to Governance History Bunge’s Board Rabin in connection to û No apparent financial services, an activist management or operating experience campaign from Wardell Ravi D.E. Shaw, when Senator’s û Connection to Cary û Served as a director at RLJ Quentin Koffey Thompson, director of Entertainment, where served as Head FNF and banker to Foley Senator was an investor of Activism network companies prior to its IPO in 2012 26


ConclusionConclusion


Our Board Has Positioned the Company to Maximize Value CoreLogic’s Board Senator/Cannae ü Has been transparent, responsive and solicited Ð Urged shareholders to accept a lowball $66 per share interest, in line with shareholder input proposal ü Appointed four new directors in last three years Ð Urged us to start an auction at a low price, which ü Is comprised of diverse directors would have resulted in much lower proposals than CoreLogic’s Board obtained ü Has proven track records of M&A Ð Nominated directors with little to no industry expertise ü Conducting a strategic review designed to maximize value for shareholders Ð Criticized the Company’s projections, which have since proven to be correct ü Shielded shareholders from the value destruction of Senator’s lowball proposal, and generated significant Ð Talked down CoreLogic’s value to support its low interest from a number of parties at $80+, a $1bn+ proposal improvement from Senator/Cannae’s proposal Who will do a better job of protecting your investment and maximizing value? Vote AGAINST The Senator/Cannae Proposals at the November 17th Special Meeting 27Our Board Has Positioned the Company to Maximize Value CoreLogic’s Board Senator/Cannae ü Has been transparent, responsive and solicited Ð Urged shareholders to accept a lowball $66 per share interest, in line with shareholder input proposal ü Appointed four new directors in last three years Ð Urged us to start an auction at a low price, which ü Is comprised of diverse directors would have resulted in much lower proposals than CoreLogic’s Board obtained ü Has proven track records of M&A Ð Nominated directors with little to no industry expertise ü Conducting a strategic review designed to maximize value for shareholders Ð Criticized the Company’s projections, which have since proven to be correct ü Shielded shareholders from the value destruction of Senator’s lowball proposal, and generated significant Ð Talked down CoreLogic’s value to support its low interest from a number of parties at $80+, a $1bn+ proposal improvement from Senator/Cannae’s proposal Who will do a better job of protecting your investment and maximizing value? Vote AGAINST The Senator/Cannae Proposals at the November 17th Special Meeting 27


AppendixAppendix


The Senator / Cannae Campaign Has Been All About Misinformation and Hostile Tactics, Not Value Senator/Cannae’s torrent of misinformation obfuscates the facts in an attempt to take value from CoreLogic shareholders Senator/Cannae Have Made Many Erroneous Claims… …While In Fact: (1) Claim their $66 per share proposal is compellingü At our pre-COVID and pre-proposal multiple of 11.3x , the implied trading price based on our current guidance would be ~$70, with no takeover premium “We Have Made a Compelling Proposal” (2) ü The implied multiple of their original proposal, ~13.4x , now implies a price of ~$88 ü The current median research analyst price target is $72, significantly above their proposal (and has — Senator/Cannae Presentation (10/21) been trending upward) ü Their presentation conspicuously excludes any research analyst comments since July – likely because price targets have been trending sharply upward and commentary widely cites to our potential for multiple expansion ü Since the June proposal, we have announced a $1bn share repurchase, increased our dividend by (3) 50%, and increased our adjusted EBITDA guidance by ~$110mm – which translates into $16/share of additional value at the 11.3x multiple and $18/share at the 13.4x multiple Ascribe no value to our recent performance Our recent momentum is sustainable and real: (4) (4) ü We have increased our non-mortgage business mix to ~45% and expect to reach 50% by 2022 “The current surge in mortgage origination volumes ü ~95% of our revenues are recurring with 55% fixed recurring reflected in second and third quarter results does not ü Recent business wins in non-mortgage segments (e.g. Liberty) provide significant visibility to the impact our assessment of value” sustainability of our strong performance ü Perhaps Senator/Cannae meant to say that our revenue and earnings outperformance and avalanche — Senator/Cannae Letter to CoreLogic Board (9/14) of cash flow won’t change their low ball offer – because it’s not credible to say that it doesn’t impact value (especially when research analyst price targets are trending sharply upward) 1. Trading multiple based on 2/20/2020 closing price of $51.50 and midpoint of 2020 guidance issued on 2/19/2020; trading multiple based on midpoint of 2020 guidance at the time immediately prior to the launch of the hostile proposal 2. Multiple implied by Senator/Cannae’s initial $65/share proposal and 2020E Management guidance midpoint adjusted EBITDA (~$513m) at the time immediately prior to the launch of the hostile proposal 28 3. Based on midpoint of guidance ranges 4. Reflects elimination of discontinued operationsThe Senator / Cannae Campaign Has Been All About Misinformation and Hostile Tactics, Not Value Senator/Cannae’s torrent of misinformation obfuscates the facts in an attempt to take value from CoreLogic shareholders Senator/Cannae Have Made Many Erroneous Claims… …While In Fact: (1) Claim their $66 per share proposal is compellingü At our pre-COVID and pre-proposal multiple of 11.3x , the implied trading price based on our current guidance would be ~$70, with no takeover premium “We Have Made a Compelling Proposal” (2) ü The implied multiple of their original proposal, ~13.4x , now implies a price of ~$88 ü The current median research analyst price target is $72, significantly above their proposal (and has — Senator/Cannae Presentation (10/21) been trending upward) ü Their presentation conspicuously excludes any research analyst comments since July – likely because price targets have been trending sharply upward and commentary widely cites to our potential for multiple expansion ü Since the June proposal, we have announced a $1bn share repurchase, increased our dividend by (3) 50%, and increased our adjusted EBITDA guidance by ~$110mm – which translates into $16/share of additional value at the 11.3x multiple and $18/share at the 13.4x multiple Ascribe no value to our recent performance Our recent momentum is sustainable and real: (4) (4) ü We have increased our non-mortgage business mix to ~45% and expect to reach 50% by 2022 “The current surge in mortgage origination volumes ü ~95% of our revenues are recurring with 55% fixed recurring reflected in second and third quarter results does not ü Recent business wins in non-mortgage segments (e.g. Liberty) provide significant visibility to the impact our assessment of value” sustainability of our strong performance ü Perhaps Senator/Cannae meant to say that our revenue and earnings outperformance and avalanche — Senator/Cannae Letter to CoreLogic Board (9/14) of cash flow won’t change their low ball offer – because it’s not credible to say that it doesn’t impact value (especially when research analyst price targets are trending sharply upward) 1. Trading multiple based on 2/20/2020 closing price of $51.50 and midpoint of 2020 guidance issued on 2/19/2020; trading multiple based on midpoint of 2020 guidance at the time immediately prior to the launch of the hostile proposal 2. Multiple implied by Senator/Cannae’s initial $65/share proposal and 2020E Management guidance midpoint adjusted EBITDA (~$513m) at the time immediately prior to the launch of the hostile proposal 28 3. Based on midpoint of guidance ranges 4. Reflects elimination of discontinued operations


The Senator / Cannae Campaign Has Been All About Misinformation and Hostile Tactics, Not Value (Cont’d) Senator/Cannae’s torrent of misinformation obfuscates the facts in an attempt to take value from CoreLogic shareholders Senator/Cannae Have Made Many Erroneous Claims… …While In Fact: Claim that we should be valued based on a “normalized” ü This made-up approach is fundamentally flawed and deserves no consideration • No research analysts use this approach mortgage market of $1.75tn • Their definition of what is “normal” is wrong – 2019 and 2020 are both well above this range. Even the MBA, the most conservative forecaster and the firm cited elsewhere by Senator/Cannae, has forecasted volumes of “Any Valuation of Corelogic Should Normalize For $2.13 trillion or higher for 2021, 2022 and 2023 Mortgage Volumes” • Senator/Cannae’s analysis fails to take into account any annual home price appreciation changes. For example, $1.5 trillion in 2011 would be more equivalent to approximately $2.2 trillion in 2020 with annual price appreciation of 4% to 5% — Senator/Cannae Presentation (10/21) ü This made-up analysis permeates their entire case on value, resulting in an arbitrary haircut of 25% on our 2020 value and 33% in 2021 ü Moreover, despite research analysts observing that our 2021 revenue projections may be conservative, Senator/Cannae applied a second arbitrary haircut – eliminating 10% of our 2021 EBITDA ü The collective impact of these arbitrary and, we believe, baseless adjustments was a $193 million reduction in 2021 Adjusted EBITDA – applying our pre-COVID and pre-proposal ~11.3x multiple, a reduction of $2.18 billion of value 29The Senator / Cannae Campaign Has Been All About Misinformation and Hostile Tactics, Not Value (Cont’d) Senator/Cannae’s torrent of misinformation obfuscates the facts in an attempt to take value from CoreLogic shareholders Senator/Cannae Have Made Many Erroneous Claims… …While In Fact: Claim that we should be valued based on a “normalized” ü This made-up approach is fundamentally flawed and deserves no consideration • No research analysts use this approach mortgage market of $1.75tn • Their definition of what is “normal” is wrong – 2019 and 2020 are both well above this range. Even the MBA, the most conservative forecaster and the firm cited elsewhere by Senator/Cannae, has forecasted volumes of “Any Valuation of Corelogic Should Normalize For $2.13 trillion or higher for 2021, 2022 and 2023 Mortgage Volumes” • Senator/Cannae’s analysis fails to take into account any annual home price appreciation changes. For example, $1.5 trillion in 2011 would be more equivalent to approximately $2.2 trillion in 2020 with annual price appreciation of 4% to 5% — Senator/Cannae Presentation (10/21) ü This made-up analysis permeates their entire case on value, resulting in an arbitrary haircut of 25% on our 2020 value and 33% in 2021 ü Moreover, despite research analysts observing that our 2021 revenue projections may be conservative, Senator/Cannae applied a second arbitrary haircut – eliminating 10% of our 2021 EBITDA ü The collective impact of these arbitrary and, we believe, baseless adjustments was a $193 million reduction in 2021 Adjusted EBITDA – applying our pre-COVID and pre-proposal ~11.3x multiple, a reduction of $2.18 billion of value 29


The Senator / Cannae Campaign Has Been All About Misinformation and Hostile Tactics, Not Value (Cont’d) Senator/Cannae’s torrent of misinformation obfuscates the facts in an attempt to take value from CoreLogic shareholders Senator/Cannae Have Made Many Erroneous Claims… …While In Fact: Claim that we have not shown growthü During the last four quarters, we have grown 15%, 13%, 14% and 23% on a continuing ops basis with an average of 5% organic growth “CoreLogic Has Never Grown” ü Our growth numbers are trending upwards – during Q3 2020, we achieved 23% YoY total revenue growth and 8% organic growth on a continuing ops basis — Senator/Cannae Presentation (10/21) ü Our 5% organic growth forecast in 2020 and 2021 is underpinned by high recurring revenue and 60% of our 2021 growth guidance “in the bag” from contracted new business wins ü We achieved ~5% revenue growth (CAGR) from 2011 to 2019, before our record 2020 Claim that we have not hit our margin targetü We achieved 30% adjusted EBITDA margin in Q3 2019, ahead of schedule, and have continued to grow margins throughout 2020, with 40% in Q3 “Has Not Actually Achieved” 30% EBITDA Margin ü For FY 2020, expect 36% adjusted EBITDA margin for continuing operations, and to see continued margin expansion of ~40bps per year going forward — Senator/Cannae Presentation (10/21) 30The Senator / Cannae Campaign Has Been All About Misinformation and Hostile Tactics, Not Value (Cont’d) Senator/Cannae’s torrent of misinformation obfuscates the facts in an attempt to take value from CoreLogic shareholders Senator/Cannae Have Made Many Erroneous Claims… …While In Fact: Claim that we have not shown growthü During the last four quarters, we have grown 15%, 13%, 14% and 23% on a continuing ops basis with an average of 5% organic growth “CoreLogic Has Never Grown” ü Our growth numbers are trending upwards – during Q3 2020, we achieved 23% YoY total revenue growth and 8% organic growth on a continuing ops basis — Senator/Cannae Presentation (10/21) ü Our 5% organic growth forecast in 2020 and 2021 is underpinned by high recurring revenue and 60% of our 2021 growth guidance “in the bag” from contracted new business wins ü We achieved ~5% revenue growth (CAGR) from 2011 to 2019, before our record 2020 Claim that we have not hit our margin targetü We achieved 30% adjusted EBITDA margin in Q3 2019, ahead of schedule, and have continued to grow margins throughout 2020, with 40% in Q3 “Has Not Actually Achieved” 30% EBITDA Margin ü For FY 2020, expect 36% adjusted EBITDA margin for continuing operations, and to see continued margin expansion of ~40bps per year going forward — Senator/Cannae Presentation (10/21) 30


The Senator / Cannae Campaign Has Been All About Misinformation and Hostile Tactics, Not Value (Cont’d) Senator/Cannae’s torrent of misinformation obfuscates the facts in an attempt to take value from CoreLogic shareholders Senator/Cannae Have Made Many Erroneous Claims… …While In Fact: Since they made their ill-informed claim: Claim our forecasts are overly optimistic ü We beat Q2 and Q3 revenue and EBITDA guidance handily “After years of poor organic growth, today’s multi-year ü We raised 2020 and 2021 guidance – and are on track to meet or beat it forecast implies wildly optimistic assumptions including ü Industry participants revised mortgage volume projections substantially higher, including MBA (cherry-picked mortgage originations well above consensus industry by Senator/Cannae because it’s the prognosticator that had the lowest forecasts at the time and has, as a projections.” result, been the most wrong about the trend) which has since increased its 2020 forecast by $524bn, its 2021 forecast by $404bn, and its 2022 forecast by $239bn. Remarkably, a few days after Senator/Cannae filed their October presentation, MBA published 2023 forecasts of over $2tn — Senator/Cannae Press Release (7/7) ü We have guided to 5% organic growth in 2021 and 2022 in a down mortgage market, with new business wins securing 60%+ of 2021 growth guidance “We think the co's 5% C21 organic rev growth outlook could be conservative” — (Oct 2020) Claim that we have “underperformed”ü Senator/Cannae are playing games with respect to peer selection • They include Moody’s and S&P in their peer set, which are rating agencies and not remotely comparable to our business “CoreLogic Wants an ‘Information Services Peer’ • Their comp set includes many information services companies with well under 50% mortgage exposure Multiple…But Has Not Come Close to Their Multiple, (1) over time periods during which we had well over 50% mortgage exposure Growth, or TSR.” • But elsewhere in their presentation they argue that we should not be compared to these same info services companies, and hope the reader doesn’t notice their inconsistent approach — Senator/Cannae Presentation (10/21)ü Over the last two years, we have outperformed the more accurately selected peer set of information services (1) companies with similar mortgage exposure by 8% (for the period ending before the launch of the hostile bid) ü We have outperformed the full information services peer set over the last 18 months, using a more accurate (2),(3) end point date of 6/25 (3) ü Revenue growth and adjusted EBITDA margin are above info services peer median 1. Mortgage exposed peers include: Zillow, Mr. Cooper Group, Black Knight, Fidelity National Financial, RealPage, First American, PennyMac Financial, Radian Group, Realogy, MGIC Investment Corp, Altisource, Equifax, FICO and Transunion 2. CoreLogic TSR of 66% vs. info services peer average TSR of 63% 31 3. Info services peers include: CoStar, Equifax, Experian, Fair Isaac, IHS Markit, RELX, Thomson Reuters, TransUnion, Verisk and Wolters KluwerThe Senator / Cannae Campaign Has Been All About Misinformation and Hostile Tactics, Not Value (Cont’d) Senator/Cannae’s torrent of misinformation obfuscates the facts in an attempt to take value from CoreLogic shareholders Senator/Cannae Have Made Many Erroneous Claims… …While In Fact: Since they made their ill-informed claim: Claim our forecasts are overly optimistic ü We beat Q2 and Q3 revenue and EBITDA guidance handily “After years of poor organic growth, today’s multi-year ü We raised 2020 and 2021 guidance – and are on track to meet or beat it forecast implies wildly optimistic assumptions including ü Industry participants revised mortgage volume projections substantially higher, including MBA (cherry-picked mortgage originations well above consensus industry by Senator/Cannae because it’s the prognosticator that had the lowest forecasts at the time and has, as a projections.” result, been the most wrong about the trend) which has since increased its 2020 forecast by $524bn, its 2021 forecast by $404bn, and its 2022 forecast by $239bn. Remarkably, a few days after Senator/Cannae filed their October presentation, MBA published 2023 forecasts of over $2tn — Senator/Cannae Press Release (7/7) ü We have guided to 5% organic growth in 2021 and 2022 in a down mortgage market, with new business wins securing 60%+ of 2021 growth guidance “We think the co's 5% C21 organic rev growth outlook could be conservative” — (Oct 2020) Claim that we have “underperformed”ü Senator/Cannae are playing games with respect to peer selection • They include Moody’s and S&P in their peer set, which are rating agencies and not remotely comparable to our business “CoreLogic Wants an ‘Information Services Peer’ • Their comp set includes many information services companies with well under 50% mortgage exposure Multiple…But Has Not Come Close to Their Multiple, (1) over time periods during which we had well over 50% mortgage exposure Growth, or TSR.” • But elsewhere in their presentation they argue that we should not be compared to these same info services companies, and hope the reader doesn’t notice their inconsistent approach — Senator/Cannae Presentation (10/21)ü Over the last two years, we have outperformed the more accurately selected peer set of information services (1) companies with similar mortgage exposure by 8% (for the period ending before the launch of the hostile bid) ü We have outperformed the full information services peer set over the last 18 months, using a more accurate (2),(3) end point date of 6/25 (3) ü Revenue growth and adjusted EBITDA margin are above info services peer median 1. Mortgage exposed peers include: Zillow, Mr. Cooper Group, Black Knight, Fidelity National Financial, RealPage, First American, PennyMac Financial, Radian Group, Realogy, MGIC Investment Corp, Altisource, Equifax, FICO and Transunion 2. CoreLogic TSR of 66% vs. info services peer average TSR of 63% 31 3. Info services peers include: CoStar, Equifax, Experian, Fair Isaac, IHS Markit, RELX, Thomson Reuters, TransUnion, Verisk and Wolters Kluwer


The Senator / Cannae Campaign Has Been All About Misinformation and Hostile Tactics, Not Value (Cont’d) Senator/Cannae’s torrent of misinformation obfuscates the facts in an attempt to take value from CoreLogic shareholders Senator/Cannae Have Made Many Erroneous Claims… …While In Fact: ü This is an incredibly strong Board with deep knowledge of the industry and extensive experience evaluating M&A Claim that new directors are needed at CoreLogic • 9 of 12 directors have financial and/or public company M&A experience, and have collectively executed over $20 billion of public M&A transactions “A Majority of the Board Should Be Replaced to Protect • All 12 directors have real estate, insurance, and/or technology experience Shareholder Value” • 7 of 12 directors have public company CEO / CFO / COO experience ü Our Board has presided over the transformation of CoreLogic into a leading information services company, which – Senator/Cannae Presentation (10/21) has delivered record financial results in 2020 ü We have appointed four new independent directors in the last three years “The long average tenure of the Board undermines its • Since our spin-off of First American Financial, our average tenure actually is 6.3 years, much lower than the (1) average tenure of 8.0 years of the S&P 500 independence” ü Senator/Cannae published outright falsehoods and mischaracterizations about director tenure, service and compensation. For example: – Senator/Cannae Presentation (10/21) • To pump up their misleading director tenure data, they claim Frank Martell has been a director for 10 years, when in fact he has only been a director since 2017; in fact, Frank has not been at the company for 10 years • In a failed attempt to portray our director compensation as excessive, they publish cumulative pay, when in fact we pay a standard director retainer in line with peers • To inflate their over-boarding claims, they include private company leadership roles and volunteer positions • To try to tarnish our Board’s credentials and independence, their summary of key facts about our Board includes numerous inaccuracies, distortions and mischaracterizations ü None of their nominees appear to have management, operating or M&A experience in CoreLogic’s industry Claim that their nominees have industry experience ü Ms. Rabin’s nomination appears to be a brazen attempt to win Glass Lewis support by nominating their former CEO and are “independent” and current Research Advisory Council member “Independent” Nominees Have Relevant and Provenü Several of their nominees have conflicts and issues ranging from • Potential links to or histories of previously working with Senator’s Quentin Koffey or Cannae’s Bill Foley Expertise” • Several nominees have been involved with companies subject to serious investigations and litigation on issues ranging from manipulative marketing tactics, deceptive disclosures, and poorly-executed M&A to breach of fiduciary duty, amongst other issues — Senator/Cannae Presentation (10/21) ü Above all, they are being nominated by the same party seeking to acquire the Company in a process run by the same nominees 1. 2019 Spencer Stuart Board Index 32The Senator / Cannae Campaign Has Been All About Misinformation and Hostile Tactics, Not Value (Cont’d) Senator/Cannae’s torrent of misinformation obfuscates the facts in an attempt to take value from CoreLogic shareholders Senator/Cannae Have Made Many Erroneous Claims… …While In Fact: ü This is an incredibly strong Board with deep knowledge of the industry and extensive experience evaluating M&A Claim that new directors are needed at CoreLogic • 9 of 12 directors have financial and/or public company M&A experience, and have collectively executed over $20 billion of public M&A transactions “A Majority of the Board Should Be Replaced to Protect • All 12 directors have real estate, insurance, and/or technology experience Shareholder Value” • 7 of 12 directors have public company CEO / CFO / COO experience ü Our Board has presided over the transformation of CoreLogic into a leading information services company, which – Senator/Cannae Presentation (10/21) has delivered record financial results in 2020 ü We have appointed four new independent directors in the last three years “The long average tenure of the Board undermines its • Since our spin-off of First American Financial, our average tenure actually is 6.3 years, much lower than the (1) average tenure of 8.0 years of the S&P 500 independence” ü Senator/Cannae published outright falsehoods and mischaracterizations about director tenure, service and compensation. For example: – Senator/Cannae Presentation (10/21) • To pump up their misleading director tenure data, they claim Frank Martell has been a director for 10 years, when in fact he has only been a director since 2017; in fact, Frank has not been at the company for 10 years • In a failed attempt to portray our director compensation as excessive, they publish cumulative pay, when in fact we pay a standard director retainer in line with peers • To inflate their over-boarding claims, they include private company leadership roles and volunteer positions • To try to tarnish our Board’s credentials and independence, their summary of key facts about our Board includes numerous inaccuracies, distortions and mischaracterizations ü None of their nominees appear to have management, operating or M&A experience in CoreLogic’s industry Claim that their nominees have industry experience ü Ms. Rabin’s nomination appears to be a brazen attempt to win Glass Lewis support by nominating their former CEO and are “independent” and current Research Advisory Council member “Independent” Nominees Have Relevant and Provenü Several of their nominees have conflicts and issues ranging from • Potential links to or histories of previously working with Senator’s Quentin Koffey or Cannae’s Bill Foley Expertise” • Several nominees have been involved with companies subject to serious investigations and litigation on issues ranging from manipulative marketing tactics, deceptive disclosures, and poorly-executed M&A to breach of fiduciary duty, amongst other issues — Senator/Cannae Presentation (10/21) ü Above all, they are being nominated by the same party seeking to acquire the Company in a process run by the same nominees 1. 2019 Spencer Stuart Board Index 32


The Senator / Cannae Campaign Has Been All About Misinformation and Hostile Tactics, Not Value (Cont’d) Senator/Cannae’s torrent of misinformation obfuscates the facts in an attempt to take value from CoreLogic shareholders Senator/Cannae Have Made Many Erroneous Claims… …While In Fact: Make False Claims about our governance and process Every step of the way, the Board has been focused on shareholder value: ü Met with Senator/Cannae and publicly provided projections and information a bidder would require “CoreLogic’s Board Refuses to Engage” to make a compelling proposal ü Proactively scheduled this Special Meeting, without requiring them to run a consent solicitation — Senator/Cannae Presentation (10/21) ü We have shareholder-friendly corporate governance provisions including allowing shareholders to call special meetings and act by written consent “Impedes Shareholders’ Ability to Vote at a Special ü We are engaging with third parties indicating interest in a transaction at significantly higher values Meeting” than Senator/Cannae’s lowball $66 proposal — Senator/Cannae Presentation (10/21) Assert that our adoption of a shareholder rights plan was ü We adopted a short-term shareholder rights plan in response to their rapid stealth accumulation to not in shareholder interests protect against the risk they could take control of the company without paying a takeover premium “Adopting a poison pill requiring a lengthy solicitation process” ü The Board proactively called the Special Meeting to allow shareholders to consider Senator and Cannae's proposals so there was no need to engage in a solicitation process. We assume they — Senator/Cannae Presentation (10/21) pursued the solicitation as a public relations move 33The Senator / Cannae Campaign Has Been All About Misinformation and Hostile Tactics, Not Value (Cont’d) Senator/Cannae’s torrent of misinformation obfuscates the facts in an attempt to take value from CoreLogic shareholders Senator/Cannae Have Made Many Erroneous Claims… …While In Fact: Make False Claims about our governance and process Every step of the way, the Board has been focused on shareholder value: ü Met with Senator/Cannae and publicly provided projections and information a bidder would require “CoreLogic’s Board Refuses to Engage” to make a compelling proposal ü Proactively scheduled this Special Meeting, without requiring them to run a consent solicitation — Senator/Cannae Presentation (10/21) ü We have shareholder-friendly corporate governance provisions including allowing shareholders to call special meetings and act by written consent “Impedes Shareholders’ Ability to Vote at a Special ü We are engaging with third parties indicating interest in a transaction at significantly higher values Meeting” than Senator/Cannae’s lowball $66 proposal — Senator/Cannae Presentation (10/21) Assert that our adoption of a shareholder rights plan was ü We adopted a short-term shareholder rights plan in response to their rapid stealth accumulation to not in shareholder interests protect against the risk they could take control of the company without paying a takeover premium “Adopting a poison pill requiring a lengthy solicitation process” ü The Board proactively called the Special Meeting to allow shareholders to consider Senator and Cannae's proposals so there was no need to engage in a solicitation process. We assume they — Senator/Cannae Presentation (10/21) pursued the solicitation as a public relations move 33


The Senator / Cannae Campaign Has Been All About Misinformation and Hostile Tactics, Not Value (Cont’d) Senator/Cannae’s torrent of misinformation obfuscates the facts in an attempt to take value from CoreLogic shareholders Senator/Cannae Have Made Many Erroneous Claims… …While In Fact: Claim that we were anything but above-board with our ü We proactively called the Special Meeting and we have publicly committed that the Board would calling of the Special Meeting appoint their nominees who receive the requisite vote to fill vacancies on the Board resulting from removals at the Special Meeting “Publicly announcing the meeting while privately threatening us that the Board can refuse to replace directors and can unilaterally reschedule” ü We never made such threats or claimed we would reschedule the meeting. We plan on holding the meeting as scheduled — Senator/Cannae Presentation (10/21) 34The Senator / Cannae Campaign Has Been All About Misinformation and Hostile Tactics, Not Value (Cont’d) Senator/Cannae’s torrent of misinformation obfuscates the facts in an attempt to take value from CoreLogic shareholders Senator/Cannae Have Made Many Erroneous Claims… …While In Fact: Claim that we were anything but above-board with our ü We proactively called the Special Meeting and we have publicly committed that the Board would calling of the Special Meeting appoint their nominees who receive the requisite vote to fill vacancies on the Board resulting from removals at the Special Meeting “Publicly announcing the meeting while privately threatening us that the Board can refuse to replace directors and can unilaterally reschedule” ü We never made such threats or claimed we would reschedule the meeting. We plan on holding the meeting as scheduled — Senator/Cannae Presentation (10/21) 34


More Reasons Why You Can’t Trust Senator/Cannae Their materials are replete with half-truths, mischaracterizations and falsehoods in an attempt to distract from their lowball, opportunistic proposal to try to take value from CoreLogic shareholders • We engaged financial advisors before they launched the hostile bid – COMPLETE FALSEHOOD • We pre-released our 2Q 2020 earnings to get in front of the hostile bid – COMPLETE FALSEHOOD • We refused to engage with them before they launched their hostile bid – COMPLETE FALSEHOOD • We were not willing to call the Special Meeting – COMPLETE FALSEHOOD • Senator/Cannae owned 15% when they made their initial filing – COMPLETE FALSEHOOD • Our immaterial, ordinary course issuance of shares to our employee stock purchase plan (consistent with previous quarters) was a tactic to foil the Special Meeting – COMPLETE FALSEHOOD (1) • CoreLogic misses expectations – COMPLETE FALSEHOOD With this track record of falsehoods, can you trust ANYTHING Senator/Cannae say? 1. We have met or beat our adjusted EBITDA guidance in all 13 quarters in which we have issued it 35More Reasons Why You Can’t Trust Senator/Cannae Their materials are replete with half-truths, mischaracterizations and falsehoods in an attempt to distract from their lowball, opportunistic proposal to try to take value from CoreLogic shareholders • We engaged financial advisors before they launched the hostile bid – COMPLETE FALSEHOOD • We pre-released our 2Q 2020 earnings to get in front of the hostile bid – COMPLETE FALSEHOOD • We refused to engage with them before they launched their hostile bid – COMPLETE FALSEHOOD • We were not willing to call the Special Meeting – COMPLETE FALSEHOOD • Senator/Cannae owned 15% when they made their initial filing – COMPLETE FALSEHOOD • Our immaterial, ordinary course issuance of shares to our employee stock purchase plan (consistent with previous quarters) was a tactic to foil the Special Meeting – COMPLETE FALSEHOOD (1) • CoreLogic misses expectations – COMPLETE FALSEHOOD With this track record of falsehoods, can you trust ANYTHING Senator/Cannae say? 1. We have met or beat our adjusted EBITDA guidance in all 13 quarters in which we have issued it 35


Reconciliation of Adjusted EBITDA Historical Results ($ in millions, unaudited) Q1 2018 Q2 2018 Q3 2018 Q4 2018 Q1 2019 Q2 2019 Q3 2019 Q4 2019 Q1 2020 Q2 2020 Q3 2020 Net Income/(Loss) from Continuing $ 16.4 $ 42.1 $ 8.7 $ 6.9 $ (7.9) $ (15.6) $ 31.7 $ 25.5 $ 24.3 $ 51.1 $ 102.5 Operations Income Taxes (4 .6) 12.8 16.2 5.7 (2.3) (18.3) 11.7 7.2 10.0 19.3 (9 .2) Share-based Compensation 8.6 10.9 9.5 7.5 9.7 7.6 8.8 9.2 8.0 13.4 12.5 Non-Operating Losses/(Gains) 0.4 (0.3) (1.4) (1 6.7) 2.5 18.0 (1 .2) 7.4 4.1 (4 .4) (35.3) Efficiency Investments and other 0.5 4.7 6.6 9.2 13.0 12.6 6.4 7.5 5.0 5.1 7.7 Transaction Costs 2.0 2.6 2.1 4.6 1.7 1.9 1.7 1.9 2.5 (2.5) 0.8 Unsolicited Proposal Related Costs - - - - - - - - - - 36.7 Depreciation and Amortization 43.7 44.7 45.6 47.2 46.4 44.0 42.4 42.3 43.6 43.5 43.6 Impairment Loss - 0.0 - 7.6 - 47.8 - - - 1.2 - Interest Expense 17.2 18.8 19.1 19.0 18.7 19.2 19.5 18.7 17.8 17.6 16.9 Amortization of Acquired Software (Equity 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 - - - in earnings of Affliates) Adjusted EBITDA $ 84.4 $ 136.6 $ 106.6 $ 91.1 $ 82.0 $ 117.2 $ 121.0 $ 119.9 $ 115.1 $ 144.3 $ 176.3 36Reconciliation of Adjusted EBITDA Historical Results ($ in millions, unaudited) Q1 2018 Q2 2018 Q3 2018 Q4 2018 Q1 2019 Q2 2019 Q3 2019 Q4 2019 Q1 2020 Q2 2020 Q3 2020 Net Income/(Loss) from Continuing $ 16.4 $ 42.1 $ 8.7 $ 6.9 $ (7.9) $ (15.6) $ 31.7 $ 25.5 $ 24.3 $ 51.1 $ 102.5 Operations Income Taxes (4 .6) 12.8 16.2 5.7 (2.3) (18.3) 11.7 7.2 10.0 19.3 (9 .2) Share-based Compensation 8.6 10.9 9.5 7.5 9.7 7.6 8.8 9.2 8.0 13.4 12.5 Non-Operating Losses/(Gains) 0.4 (0.3) (1.4) (1 6.7) 2.5 18.0 (1 .2) 7.4 4.1 (4 .4) (35.3) Efficiency Investments and other 0.5 4.7 6.6 9.2 13.0 12.6 6.4 7.5 5.0 5.1 7.7 Transaction Costs 2.0 2.6 2.1 4.6 1.7 1.9 1.7 1.9 2.5 (2.5) 0.8 Unsolicited Proposal Related Costs - - - - - - - - - - 36.7 Depreciation and Amortization 43.7 44.7 45.6 47.2 46.4 44.0 42.4 42.3 43.6 43.5 43.6 Impairment Loss - 0.0 - 7.6 - 47.8 - - - 1.2 - Interest Expense 17.2 18.8 19.1 19.0 18.7 19.2 19.5 18.7 17.8 17.6 16.9 Amortization of Acquired Software (Equity 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 - - - in earnings of Affliates) Adjusted EBITDA $ 84.4 $ 136.6 $ 106.6 $ 91.1 $ 82.0 $ 117.2 $ 121.0 $ 119.9 $ 115.1 $ 144.3 $ 176.3 36


Reconciliation of Adjusted EPS Historical Results (per share, unaudited) Q1 2018 Q2 2018 Q3 2018 Q4 2018 Q1 2019 Q2 2019 Q3 2019 Q4 2019 Q1 2020 Q2 2020 Q3 2020 Net Income/(Loss) from Continuing $ 0.20 $ 0.51 $ 0.11 $ 0.08 $ (0.10) $ (0.19) $ 0.39 $ 0.32 $ 0.30 $ 0.63 $ 1.26 Operations Share-based Compensation 0.10 0.13 0.12 0.09 0.12 0.09 0.11 0.11 0.10 0.17 0.15 Non-Operating Losses/(Gains) 0.01 - (0 .02) (0 .21) 0.03 0.22 (0 .02) 0.09 0.05 (0.06) (0.43) Efficiency Investments and other 0.01 0.06 0.08 0.11 0.16 0.15 0.08 0.09 0.06 0.06 0.10 Transaction Costs 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.06 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 (0.03) 0.01 Unsolicited Proposal Related Costs - - - - - - - - - - 0.45 (1) Depreciation and Amortization 0.22 0.23 0.23 0.24 0.24 0.23 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.22 Amortization of Acquired Software (Equity - - - - - - - - - - - in earnings of Affliates) Impairment Loss - - - 0.09 - 0.59 - - - 0.02 - Income Tax Effect (0.19) (0 .13) - (0.06) (0.14) (0 .44) (0 .08) (0.13) (0 .10) (0.08) (0.55) Adjusted EPS $ 0.37 $ 0.83 $ 0.55 $ 0.40 $ 0.33 $ 0.67 $ 0.71 $ 0.71 $ 0.65 $ 0.92 $ 1.21 1. Reflects the income tax effect on adjustments and the differential impact on assumed tax rate and effective tax rate 37Reconciliation of Adjusted EPS Historical Results (per share, unaudited) Q1 2018 Q2 2018 Q3 2018 Q4 2018 Q1 2019 Q2 2019 Q3 2019 Q4 2019 Q1 2020 Q2 2020 Q3 2020 Net Income/(Loss) from Continuing $ 0.20 $ 0.51 $ 0.11 $ 0.08 $ (0.10) $ (0.19) $ 0.39 $ 0.32 $ 0.30 $ 0.63 $ 1.26 Operations Share-based Compensation 0.10 0.13 0.12 0.09 0.12 0.09 0.11 0.11 0.10 0.17 0.15 Non-Operating Losses/(Gains) 0.01 - (0 .02) (0 .21) 0.03 0.22 (0 .02) 0.09 0.05 (0.06) (0.43) Efficiency Investments and other 0.01 0.06 0.08 0.11 0.16 0.15 0.08 0.09 0.06 0.06 0.10 Transaction Costs 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.06 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 (0.03) 0.01 Unsolicited Proposal Related Costs - - - - - - - - - - 0.45 (1) Depreciation and Amortization 0.22 0.23 0.23 0.24 0.24 0.23 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.22 Amortization of Acquired Software (Equity - - - - - - - - - - - in earnings of Affliates) Impairment Loss - - - 0.09 - 0.59 - - - 0.02 - Income Tax Effect (0.19) (0 .13) - (0.06) (0.14) (0 .44) (0 .08) (0.13) (0 .10) (0.08) (0.55) Adjusted EPS $ 0.37 $ 0.83 $ 0.55 $ 0.40 $ 0.33 $ 0.67 $ 0.71 $ 0.71 $ 0.65 $ 0.92 $ 1.21 1. Reflects the income tax effect on adjustments and the differential impact on assumed tax rate and effective tax rate 37